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Abstract 
We study physicians’ incentives to use personalized medicine techniques, replicating the 
physician’s trade-offs under the option of personalized medicine information. In a laboratory 
experiment where prospective physicians play a dual-agent real-effort game, we vary both the 
information structure (free access versus paid access to personalized medicine information) and 
the payment scheme (pay-for-performance (P4P), capitation (CAP) and fee-for-service (FFS)) by 
applying a within-subject design. Our results are threefold. i) Compared to FFS and CAP, the 
P4P payment scheme strongly impacts the decision to adopt personalized medicine. ii) Although 
expected to dominate the other schemes, P4P is not always efficient in transforming free access 
to personalized medicine into higher quality patient care. iii) When it has to be paid for, 
personalized medicine is positively associated with quality, suggesting that subjects tend to make 
better use of information that comes at a cost. We conclude that this last result can be considered 
a “commitment device”. However, quantification of our results suggests that the positive impact 
of the commitment device observed is not strong enough to justify generalizing paid access to 
personalized medicine.  
Keywords: Personalized medicine, fee-for-service, capitation, pay-for-performance, physician 
altruism and laboratory experiment. 
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1. Introduction  
Personalized medicine involves profiling patients to determine decisions, treatments or 
medical interventions according to their predicted best response. While the idea dates back to 
Hippocrates, advances in genomics and epigenetics over the last two decades have helped 
promote this type of medicine. However, even when personalized medicine technology is 
available, physicians actually tend to under-use it. Nor does the issue appear to be only one of 
cost. Health systems, and the populations covered, stand to benefit from the adoption of 
personalized medicine technologies. Better allocating treatments among patients is a promising 
way to reduce both health expenditure and adverse consequences of treatments (Nimmesgern et 
al., 2017). Here, to tackle the issue of effective adoption of personalized medicine, we examine 
how physicians’ payment schemes affect their incentives to use personalized medicine techniques, 
and the extent to which their patients may benefit from such practice.   
To study how physician payment schemes, affect their decisions to use personalized 
medicine, we designed an experiment to replicate the physician’s trade-offs under the option of 
personalized medicine information. As implemented, subjects were placed in a real-effort task 
game, as per Green (2014) and, less directly, Lagarde and Blaauw (2017). In our experiment, 
ninety-five prospective physicians performed a task simulating the option of access to 
information likely to help them take better care of a patient. First, in order to imitate the 
relationship between the physician and the patient, our game was similar to that of Green (2014), 
consisting in proofreading short texts with potential positive benefits for a third party (the 
“patient”) when the texts were corrected well. Second, we designed the task to account for 
features of personalized medicine, viewed as a set of information that can guide physicians in 
formulating medical decisions. While a physician without personalized medicine information 
needs to consider a wide set of symptoms when taking a decision, personalized information 
allows the physician to focus on a limited subset of symptoms for quicker diagnosis and more 
effective treatment. To capture this feature, a subset of “priority sentences” was defined in the 
texts and only actions within this subset was considered to generate potential benefits for the 
third party. Thus, the proofreader’s efficiency crucially depended on the informational input on 
priority sentences. Precise information on which sentences were “priority” was made available to 
the subjects, free of charge in some periods of the game but at a cost in others.   
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Depending on the payment scheme, the incentives for our subjects to make corrections in 
priority sentences differed, as do motivations for buying personalized medicine. The prospective 
physicians were subjected to different payment schemes in a mix of within/between design. We 
explored three pure payment schemes: fee-for-service (FFS), capitation payment (CAP) and 
payment-for-performance (P4P). CAP was designed as a payment per treated patient (“treated” 
text), while FFS was designed to reward the physician based on the quantity of services provided 
to the patient (number of words corrected in the text). Our P4P scheme was designed as payment 
for a minimum number of appropriate corrections in priority sentences. Our empirical strategy 
involved a two-stage panel least-square estimation, used to compare the behavior of subjects who 
bought the personalized medicine information with that of subjects who did not buy it, under the 
different payment schemes.  
Our main results, translated from proofreading to medical care, can be summarized as 
follows. First, as expected, our experiment reveals that P4P –a quality-oriented remuneration 
scheme– yields stronger incentives to physicians to buy personalized medicine techniques than 
FFS or CAP. In line with this first result, it seems that our subjects were also sensitive to financial 
incentives in their patient-care activities: while they treated more patients when paid by CAP, they 
performed more medical interventions under an FFS payment scheme (already in Green 2014). 
We also found that CAP and P4P tended to generate similar incentives regarding the number of 
interventions; however, P4P was less effective in transforming free access to personalized 
medicine into overall quality care. Interestingly, our results reveal that the impact of the 
information conveyed by personalized medicine crucially depends on whether access to it is free 
or has to be bought. When access to personalized medicine comes at a cost, differences due to 
the informational input are magnified, greatly to the patient’s benefit. We interpret this result as a 
“commitment device”. In fact, once the subjects had bought the information, they made much 
better use of it, compared to the situation where access to personalized medicine information was 
free to all the physicians. 
Finally, using a simple quantification of our experimental results to study whether it is 
advantageous to generalize paid access to personalized medicine, we find that paid access for all is 
not recommendable. Thus, since the outcomes from personalized medicine information are 
better when it comes at a cost, our results convey a strong policy recommendation: instead of 
providing free access to personalized medicine tools, the regulator should partially subsidize this 




Physician payment mechanisms is one of the central topics in health economics (Ellis and 
McGuire, 1986). As eloquently explained in McGuire, (2000), the incentives generated by 
different physician payment schemes may depend on institutional features such as the identity of 
the payer(s), the existence of market competition between physicians, or whether the health 
system is a gatekeeping one. Our main contribution to this literature is to study physicians’ 
incentives in the context of personalized medicine. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
articles really tackle this issue. Antoñanzas et al., (2015) study the cost-effectiveness of 
implementing personalized medicine. Howard et al. (2017) report on the interaction between 
financial incentives and medical decisions when physicians can use personalized medicine tests to 
choose between conventional radiotherapy and intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) for 
US breast cancer Medicare patients, so as to identify patients who are highly responsive to the 
IRMT option. Physicians work either in free-standing clinics (where their FFS payment plan also 
includes a monetary reward for treating patients with IRMT), or in hospital-based clinics (where 
they receive no additional benefits). Howard et al. (2017) find that physicians in free-standing 
clinics tend to under-use personalized medicine tests. Thanks to this original study design 
enabling comparison between physicians’ behavior in two institutional settings, their finding 
strongly suggests the need to explore the interaction between payment schemes and the adoption 
of personalized medicine. 
Counterfactuals are not always available to evaluate the properties of different payment 
schemes at work in health systems, and this is especially true of their interaction with 
personalized medicine, which is relatively new. Our article therefore relies on the literature using 
experimental methods to study physician payment. Over the last decade, a burgeoning literature 
has used experimental economics to study physician payment: Hennig-Schmidt et al., (2011); 
(Brosig-Koch et al., 2017, 2016, 2013); Green, (2014); Godager et al., (2016); Hafner et al., (2017); 
Lagarde and Blaauw, (2017). The main messages of these articles can be summarized in four 
points. First, in terms of findings, there seems to be a consensus on the incentives from FFS 
(over-provision) and CAP (under-provision), as shown in theoretical and other empirical 
investigations. Second, there is growing evidence on the incentive role of pay-for-performance 
(P4P). Green (2014) reported, for instance, that P4P combined with FFS gives higher incentives 
for services than FFS alone, and P4P combined with CAP gives lower incentives for services 
than CAP alone. Third, recent papers in experimental health economics reveal that it is crucial to 
take into consideration physicians’ altruism toward patients (see Brosig-Koch et al., [2013]; 
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Hafner et al., [2017]). Finally, Ahlert et al., (2012), Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen (2014) and Hafner 
et al. (2017) warn the research community of the importance of the subject pool. Hennig-Schmidt 
and Wiesen (2014) find that a medical subject pool behaves differently from a non-medical 
subject pool, the former tending to be more “patient-oriented” than the latter.  
In the light of this literature, we decided to recruit advanced medical students (prospective 
physicians) for our experiment. From a methodological point of view, we follow Green (2014) 
and, less directly, Lagarde and Blaauw (2017), who designed a real-effort task experiment rather 
than the ‘declared-effort’ used in earlier work on physician payment schemes. Equivalence 
between real and chosen effort has been proven for altruistic behaviors in gift-exchange games 
(Brüggen and Strobel, 2007). However, we felt that a real-effort task might be a more appropriate 
way to elicit subjects’ decisions, especially when studying complex tasks like medical 
interventions. We therefore build on Green (2014)’s task using proofreading of texts. There are, 
however, three differences between our experiment and Green (2014)’s. (i) Contrary to Green’s 
between-subject design, we use a within-subject design: each prospective physician is observed 
under two different payment schemes. (ii) We introduce personalized medicine by offering the 
physician an informational advantage that may benefit the patient (this is the core of our 
contribution). (iii) We control for heterogeneity in patients’ actions by giving them a more passive 
role.3 In Green’s experiment, the optimal quantity of services depended on the interventions of a 
first set of subjects (the patients, hereafter subjects-1), while we impose more standardized 
behavior on the first set of subjects.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
Most experimental studies on physicians’ behaviors aim at imitating the bilateral 
relationship between the physician and the patient. To recreate the physician-patient relationship, 
we first included an experimental session where economics students had to highlight words 
(Phase 1), thereby furnishing the “patient” base for Phase 2. The second phase addressed our 
main research question through several sessions with prospective physicians. Our instructions did 
not involve any contextual indications to physicians that they were acting out a patient/doctor 
relationship. 
																																								 																				
3	As our main focus is the physician’s behavior, patients have a “passive” role. In Green’s experiment, patients’ 
actions determined the ideal quantity of services from the physicians. Our design seeks rather to control patients’ 
heterogeneity, to better focus on the issue of personalized medicine.	
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Overall, 48 short texts were used, 36 of primary-school level and 12 of first-year 
secondary-school level. Each text contained words with errors (spelling, syntax, vocabulary) 
highlighted in bold. Following Green (2014), we also put in bold 2 correct words, to leave room 
for over-provision of services by physicians. The words selected were easy to proofread, as the 
aim of the experiment was not to test the physicians’ writing skills. To represent personalized 
medicine, we randomly underlined certain sentences, referred to as “priority sentences”. These 
alone determined the patients’ earnings, standing for their biological characteristics. All the texts 
contained priority sentences: information on them was not available in period 1 of the game, was 
given free in period 2, and could be bought in period 3.  
 
2.1 Experimental design: Phase 1 of the game (passive patient role) 
For the first step aiming to introduce “real” patients, we recruited 8 subjects from the 
department of economics of Aix-Marseille University to play the role of patients. Note that the 
main reason why we needed a first-stage subject (hereafter referred to as “subject-1”) was to 
allow for other-regarding preferences.  
Each of the 8 subjects was randomly assigned 2 sets of 6 texts. In one of the 2 sets, some 
words (both correct and incorrect) were in bold. The task of each of the 8 subjects was to 
highlight manually, on the unmarked set of texts, words that were in bold on another set. They 
used a yellow highlighter for this task. They were told that they were participating in a 2-phase 
game in which they were playing the first phase. To ensure incentive compatibility, we informed 
them that an additional payment would be generated by other subjects playing phase 2 of the 
game. Moreover, for this session, each of the 8 subjects was given a fixed endowment of €10. 
Each “bold-word” missed in the text incurred a penalty of €0.10.  
Phase 1 took place in December 2016. All subjects behaved appropriately by “hand-
highlighting” in yellow all the words found in bold in the other set of texts. Thereafter, in our 
instructions for the Phase 2 game with physicians, we made it clear to the physicians that their 
actions would benefit a real subject elsewhere, called “subject-1”. In Figure 1, we present the 




Figure 1: Timeline of the main steps of the experiment 
 
2.2 Experimental design: Phase 2 of the game (physician role) 
In phase 2, we ran different experimental sessions with advanced medical students playing 
physicians. We implemented a within-subject design by “treating” each physician subject with 
two different payment mechanisms. Such a design enhances statistical inference because each 
subject is his own control. We introduced a representation of personalized medicine by including 
access to information on priority sentences (underlined). Each treatment contained three 
successive periods of proofreading corresponding to three informational contexts:  
• Period 1: 8 texts were presented without showing priority sentences, corresponding to a 
situation where personalized medicine is not available.   
• Period 2: 8 texts were presented with priority sentences underlined, corresponding to a 
situation where personalized medicine is accessible free of charge. 
• Period 3: the physician first had 1 minute to choose between a file of 8 texts with priority 
sentences underlined (personalized medicine) or a file of texts with no information. He 
then corrected the texts, playing the game either as in period 1 or 2. If he chose to have 
access to priority sentences, he was charged a fixed 0.50€ per treated text (a text was 
considered treated if there was at least one correction). He was not charged otherwise. 
Experimenter: choice of  
48 short texts. Words are 
highlighted in bold (some 
correct, some incorrect). 
Phase 1: 
 8 subjects (patients) 
assigned 6 texts each. They 
have to "hand-highlight" in 
yellow words to be 
corrected. 
Experimenter: duplication in 
95 units of  "hand-
highlighted" texts. 
+ Representation of  personalized 
medicine in texts: priority sentences 
are marked - for period 2 and 
(potentially) for period 3 
Phase 2:  
95 subjects (physicians) 
intervene on the texts with 
hand-highlighted words, 




This corresponds to a situation where the physician chooses whether or not to buy 
personalized medicine. 
Example of a text from period 1 (personalized medicine not available).  
 
 
Example of dictation given in period 2 (resp. period 4). 
 
 








Figure 2: Examples of texts given to physicians in periods 1 and 2. 
In Figure 2, we show an example of the texts given to physicians. The words in yellow are 
those to be proofread. Some of these words are correct, while others are not (in the Period 1 
example above, only the words “vivant” and “culbuté” contain errors). The main difference 
between period 1 and period 2 is the fact that priority sentences are underlined in period 2. In 
period 3, depending on the physician’s choice, the texts were either as in period 1 or in period 2. 
We gave physicians 5 minutes per period to correct 8 short texts. They were free to 
allocate their time on the texts as they wished, including not altering some of them. For each 
treatment (payment mechanism), 24 texts were proposed (8 per period), so physicians could work 
on up to 48 texts per experimental session. Treatment variables were Capitation payment (CAP), 
Il est inexplicable que nous soyons vivant. Je remonte ma lampe électrique à la main, les traces de l’avion sur 
le sol. A deux cent cinquante mètres de son point d’arrêt nous retrouvons déjà des ferrailles tordues et des 
tôles dont, tout le long de son parcours, il a éclaboussé le sable, […]  
L’avion sans culbuté, a fait son chemin sur le ventre avec une colère et des mouvements de queue de reptile. 
A deux cent soixante-dix kilomètre-heure il a rampé. Nous devons sans doute notre vie à ces pierres noires et 
rondes qui roulent librement sur le sable et qui ont formé plateau à billes.  
J’admirais lentement ressortir de mille trous, de milles anfractuosités du roc, tout ce que mon approche avait 
fait fuir. Tout se mettait à respirer, à palpiter ; le roc même semblait prendre vie et ce qu’on croyait inerte 
commençait timidement à se mouvoir, des êtres translucides, bizarres, aux allures fantasques, surgissaient 
d’entre le laxis des algues ; l’eau se peuplait ; le sable clair qui tapissait le fond, par places s’agitait et, tout au 
bout de tubes ternes qu’on eût pris pour de vieilles tiges de jonc, on voyait une frêle corolle, craintive encore 
un peu, par petits soubresauts s’épanouir.   
Un novice des choses de l’Alpe eût été surpris de constater la légèreté, contrastant avec la lourdeur générale de 
leur allure, avec laquelle les deux montagnards posaient le pieds sur les cailloux effrités du chemin. Aucune 
pierre ne roulait et les clous mordaient la terre avec ensemble, donnant l’impression d’une totale adhérence. 
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Pay-For-Performance (P4P) and Fee-For-Service (FFS). Under CAP, the physician was paid 
€1.75 for each of the 8 texts showing at least one intervention on the highlighted words 
regardless of whether appropriate. Under FFS, physicians earned €0.30 per intervention, again 
regardless of appropriacy. Each text had a minimum of 6 highlighted words and a maximum of 
12, so that the earnings range per text under FFS was between €1.80 and €3.60. Under P4P, the 
physician earned €2.50 per text if 80% of words in priority sentences were correctly written at the 
end of the proofreading, and nothing otherwise. The priority sentences contained between 5 and 
9 words, and their positions in the texts varied.  
To avoid portfolio strategies, we remunerated 2 periods chosen randomly (one period for 
the first treatment and one period for the second treatment). 
Table 1: Payment mechanism parameters (summary) 
CAP €1.75 per subject-1 treated 
FFS €0.30 per intervention 
P4P €2.50 per subject-1 treated 
 
To implement the within-subject design, the game was presented to physicians as a game 
in 2 parts. In each part, the physicians played the 3 periods and they were informed of the 
payment system at the beginning of each part. We randomized the order of P4P.   
Table 2: Different sessions of the experiment 
Treatment for part 1 – 




Date of the session 
Session 1: P4P – FFS  Marseille 24 January 2017 
Session 2: CAP – P4P  Marseille 21 February 2017 
Session 3: P4P – CAP Nice 25 March 2017 
Session 4: FFS – P4P  Nice 25 March 2017 
 
The 4 sessions of phase 2 took place between January and March 2017. All our 95 
prospective physicians were advanced medical students from Aix-Marseille and Nice Universities. 
As mentioned in the introduction, medical students were chosen because there is evidence that 




Patients’ benefits from Phase 2 
The experimenter informed physicians that their actions could generate a financial gain 
for their subject-1 counterparts who had highlighted words in the texts in phase 1 of the dual 
game. This represents the altruistic part of medical activity.4 Subject-1 counterparts would receive 
€5 if 90% of the highlighted words in priority sentences were corrected appropriately, and 
nothing otherwise. 
Recruitment procedure 
To ensure anonymity of registrations, students received an email from the student’s 
association informing them about the sessions of the experiment, its expected duration (one 
hour) and the earnings range (up to €40). A dedicated website was constructed for registration, 
and all sessions took place in an auditorium. The auditorium was prepared prior to subjects’ 
arrival with all the materials that would be needed during the experiment: pens, sets of texts and 
instructions. There was enough space between subjects to make it impossible to see other 
subjects’ work. Subjects had 15 minutes to read instructions and complete a comprehension test 
on them (results available on request). To ensure anonymity with respect to the experimenter and 
the students’ association, subjects’ earnings were delivered to them by the university accountants 
after calculation. 
At the end of each experimental session, we collected personal information covering 
gender, age, other demographic features, attitudes toward risk, and declared altruism. The 
questionnaire also included a set of other questions capturing attitudes and practices related to 
the proofreading task that subjects had to perform in the experiment: their perceived writing 
skills, their performance in secondary school, and their appetite for medical decision technologies 
(named TECHNO in the econometric analysis). Of this additional set, the first two variables 
were used as controls for the analysis, while TECHNO was also used as an instrumental variable. 
The mean age of the 95 advanced medical students was 22 years old. They were mainly 
female (57%) and in the later years of their medical studies (58% in their fourth year or higher). 
The minimum earnings per physician was €6.20 and the maximum €35.40, with a mean and a 
																																								 																				
4	There are two main ways to introduce altruistic preferences in experiments on physician payment: (i) experimenters 
inform the subject playing the role of physician that his game-generated gains for “patients” will benefit charitable 
organizations, or (ii) experimenters explicitly recruit subjects to play the role of patients, who will receive payments. 
Both scenarios are incentive-compatible ways of generating altruism used by authors cited in the introduction. 
However, the first method might be associated with free-riding on other subjects’ altruism and therefore lead to 
overall artificially lower levels of altruism. For this reason, in our experiment we explicitly introduce patients as 
subjects-1 from the first phase.	
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median around €20. Out of the 95 subjects playing physicians, 5 did not collect their earnings. All 
subjects-1 collected their additionally-generated payments. 
2.3 External validity of the experiment 
Our experiment uses proofreading tasks to simulate situations in which the physician can 
benefit from personalized medicine. The patient declares his symptoms to the physicians 
(highlighted words in texts) and the physician intervenes to advise, diagnose and treat the patient 
(proofreading task). Periods 1 and 2 serve as initialization sessions, with personalized medicine 
free in period 2. The aim is to familiarize physicians with the game and help them understand the 
benefits of personalized medicine: the use of external technologies, yielding a more accurate and 
detailed patient profile. Thus, in period 3 of the experiment, we give the physician access to 
additional information on the patient’s characteristics through the priority sentences, which only 
generate payment for subject-1. In the context of this experiment, the cost to physicians is 
monetary and the benefit to patients is a monetary reward.5 Table 3 summarizes how our 
experimental settings correspond to real-life medical settings. 
Table 3: Correspondence between experimental and real-life personalized medicine 
settings 
 In experimental setting In real-life setting 
Baseline: Period 1 – 
similar to Green (2014)’s 
experiment 
Crude declaration of wrong 
words by subject-1 &  priority 
sentences not shown 
Crude declaration of symptoms by 
patient &  subset of relevant symptoms 
not shown 
Period 2:  
PM free 
Priority sentence shown, 
physician can target/focus 
interventions 
Subset of relevant symptoms shown, 
physician can target/focus interventions  
Period 3:  
PM bought and voluntary 
Are you willing to buy the 
information on priority 
sentences?   
Are you willing to buy (/spend time on 




-% quality of overall text 
-per intervention 





5	This monetarization is, in our view, the main limitation to the external validity of the experiment: in the real word, 
the reward to the patient is a health benefit and the penalty to the physician a time loss (although this could actually 
become a monetary loss in many payment systems).	
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The main attribute of personalized medicine is that it gives physicians the opportunity to 
focus on the relevant subset of symptoms, thereby achieving more effective selection of medical 
interventions. Adopting personalized medicine techniques usually has a cost, requiring doctors to 
leave their office for training in particular, but it increases the efficacy of their patient care. Our 
experiment aims to capture this fixed cost/variable cost trade-off. Our prospective physicians (in 
period 3) have to pay a price, intended to capture this opportunity cost of time. Our priority 
sentences, on the other hand, are intended to capture the potential efficiency gain for physicians 
from “buying” personalized medicine. Our prospective physicians can allocate this efficiency gain 
to treat more texts, or to increase the quality of their intervention on each text treated. It is well 
documented that personalized medicine techniques enable physicians to focus on the subset of 
symptoms that will allow them to choose the most appropriate therapeutic alternative for their 
patients' characteristics. Our experimental setting works in a similar way: instead of a badly 
informed doctor seeing various sentences in the text as alternatives for action, the well-informed 
doctor uses the information related to the priority sentence to choose the best course of action. 
 
3. Results 
We focus on two issues to describe physicians’ behaviors. First, we look at their decision to 
invest in personalized medicine information through the decision in period 3 and we describe the main 
determinants of this choice, mainly in relation to the payment schemes. Second, we look at the 
quality of services. For this second issue, the main variable is having access to the information 
allowing personalization and its correlation with some key quality indicators; this correlation is 
also examined in interaction with the payment schemes. There are two sub-questions related to 
the issue of quality: Do the physicians’ qualitative outcomes change when they obtain 
personalized medicine information free of charge? Do they change when this information is 
accessible but has to be paid for?  
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3.1 Result 1: Decision to invest in personalized medicine information 
Our first results deal with the decision to acquire information allowing the practice of 
personalized medicine. In the following table, we report the decision to buy the information on 
priority sentences by payment mechanism.  
Table 4: Decision to buy information and payment mechanisms 
Payment system 
Decisions 
P4P FFS CAP Total decisions 
Buy 55 9 13 77 
Not buy 40 40 33 113 
Total number of subjects  95 49 46 190 
p-value = 4.236e-06 from a Khi-2 independence test.  
Table 4 shows that the number of physicians choosing to buy personalized medicine 
information, i.e. paying for information on which sentences are priority, is greater in the P4P 
scheme (58% of subjects) than in the CAP (28% of all CAP subjects) and the FFS (19% of FFS 
subjects). Thus, at first glance the decision to buy personalized medicine information is not 
independent of the proposed payment scheme (p-value<0.05). 
The decision to invest in such information was further investigated using a Probit model. We 
hypothesized that the decision to purchase information on priority sentences might be influenced 
not only by the payment scheme but also by a set of other explanatory variables: the physicians’ 
self-declared appetite for innovative technologies (TECHNO variable, as determined from the 
questionnaire at the end of each session), their declared writing skills, their gender and their 
secondary school performance.  
Our estimation results summarized in Table 5 reveal that there is a positive and statistically 
significant association between the purchase decision and the appetite of physicians for 
innovative technologies (Reference for interpretation: very likely). Other variables were used as 
controls for regressions (coefficients not shown). When it comes to payment methods, the Probit 
estimation corroborates the descriptive analysis: compared to the P4P, the FFS and CAP are less 




Table 5: Variables affecting the decision to buy information on priority sentences 
Dependent variable: decision to invest in the information on priority sentences  
Probit model 
FFS (Ref: P4P) -1.072*** (0.254) 
CAP (Ref: P4P) -0.919*** (0.247) 
TECHNO       Strongly 0.606** (0.266) 
                        Weakly 0.838* (0.450) 
Controls included?  Yes 
Constant -2.526 (1.610) 
Observations 190 
Log Likelihood -110.488 
Akaike Inf. Crit 238.976 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
  
The fact that P4P is associated with a higher probability of buying personalized medicine 
information can be explained by the opening for double motivation under P4P in physicians’ 
preferences: expectation of financial return and altruism. Unlike P4P, buying information on 
priority sentences under CAP and FFS would stem from altruism alone, since these schemes do 
not provide physicians with any financial incentive to do so.  
To describe quality outcomes, our identification strategy is twofold. We compare physicians’ 
behaviors with and without free personalized medicine information, and we perform the same 
analysis when such information has to be paid for. 
3.2 Result 2: Access to information and physicians’ qualitative outcomes 
Before describing our results on qualitative outcomes, a natural transition would have 
been to look at physicians’ quantitative outcomes (number of interventions and number of texts). 
However, since our results are comparable to those in the literature, i.e. more interventions 
(words proofread) in FFS, more patients (texts treated) in CAP, these results are relegated to 
appendices. Interestingly, it is worth noting that CAP and P4P generated similar outcomes in 
terms of number of interventions, while FFS and P4P yielded similar outcomes in terms of 
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number of patients (indicators not statistically different across payment schemes). As our focus 
here is on the impact of personalized medicine techniques on patients’ health, we select the 
variables involved in quality outcomes, with direct implications for patients’ health. We first 
introduce our results on the setting where access to information was free.  
3.2.1 Free access to information and physicians’ qualitative outcomes 
The design of the experiment allows us to compare results in period 1 with those in period 2, 
i.e. to compare behaviors in a “no information” setting with those in a “free information” setting. 
As is common, we first report descriptive statistics and complement these by estimating an 
econometric model to provide further evidence.6 The econometric model is the following: 𝑦!"# = 𝑐 +  𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑦!" + 𝛾!𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" + 𝜃!𝑃𝑎𝑦!" ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" + Θ!𝑋! + 𝜖!"# (1). 
In equation (1): 
- 𝑦!"#  is the outcome of 𝑖, (𝑖 ∈ 1− 95 ) physician; period 𝑡 𝑡 ∈ 𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜, 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜  
in treatment T. We will consider three outcome variables: the degree of focus of actions, 
the number of well-treated (appropriately corrected) texts and the rate of well-treated 
texts.  
- 𝑐 is the constant and 𝛼! is the individual specific effect.  
- 𝑃𝑎𝑦!" is the payment mechanism in treatment T. This is a categorical variable with three 
modalities: P4P, FFS and CAP. Our reference is P4P. 𝛽 is a vector of parameters that 
identifies the pure effect of the payment method on the outcome. 
- 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" is a binary variable equal to 1 in period 2 (“free information”), and to 0 in period 
1 (“no information”). Our reference is “no information” (period 1). 𝛾 is a vector that 
captures the effect of information on the outcome.  
- 𝜃 captures the interaction effect between free information and payment method. When 
significant, results are reported.  
- 𝑋 is the fixed set of objective time invariant control variables.  
- 𝜖 is an idiosyncratic error term.  
Due to the repetition of observations on the same subject (through our within-subject 
design), our dataset is a panel. Our three dependent variables are the physician’s degree of focus, 
																																								 																				
6	In particular, the experiment –voluntarily- created a self-selection process, through the decision to have access to 
the informational input, as can arise in real life. In some of the studied mechanisms, control of this self-selection bias 
(by its main correlates) was required. 	
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the number and the rate of well-treated texts. Given the fact that our design uses a task involving 
specific skills (proofreading of texts), we seek to control the average effects by time-invariant 
individual characteristics such as performance at secondary school, self-declared writing skills and 
gender. Estimation results presented below are from a random effect model, applied to control 
and identify the effect of time-invariant regressors. The implicit assumption is that there are no 
unobserved individual characteristics influencing our dependent variable. This assumption is valid 
if the control questions, such as self-declared writing skills and gender, capture a sizable part of 
the inter-individual heterogeneity. The Hausman test is performed to challenge this intuition. 
Running a fixed and a random effect model, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the 
preferred model is the random-effect model. 
3.2.1.1 Free access to information and physicians’ degree of focus 
 The focus variable allows us to capture how physicians oriented their intervention with 
the informational tool at their disposal. We measure the focus variable by looking at the rate of 
interventions outside priority sentences (number of interventions outside priority sentences 
divided by the total number of interventions). The degree of focus captures the proportion of 
actions with no impact on the final benefit to subjects-1 (patients). This criterion is a measure of 
quality, as it captures how well the physician focuses on the patient’s problem. Figure 3 and Table 
6 present both descriptive statistics and results of our estimation. 













Table 6: Impact of free information and payment mechanisms on degree of focus 
 
Dependent variable: Focus (rate of interventions outside priority sentences) 
Model: Random effect panel linear model 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
FFS (Ref: P4P) 0.341***(0.036) 0.303***(0.046) 0.371***(0.056) 
CAP (Ref: P4P) -0.039(0.035) -0.048(0.036) -0.081*(0.047) 
INFO (Ref: No info) -0.244***(0.026) -0.244***(0.026) -0.227***(0.036) 
Controls included?  No Yes Yes 
INFO in the FFS payment system 
  
-0.136**(0.061) 
INFO in the CAP payment system 
  
0.067(0.060) 
Constant 0.284***(0.025) 0.511*(0.289) 0.503*(0.290) 
Observations 190 190 190 
R2 0.522 0.528 0.550 
Adjusted R2 0.514 0.510 0.527 
F Statistic 
67.651*** (df = 3; 
186) 
29.130*** (df = 7; 
182) 
24.408*** (df = 9; 
180) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Remember that correcting words outside priority sentences is not of any benefit to 
patients.7 When information is available, the degree of focus as measured by the intervention rate 
outside priority sentences is lower whatever the payment scheme (columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, 
variable ‘INFO’; and Figure-3-histogram bars in “No information” vs bars in “Free 
information”). From Figure 3, we can see that, when information is made available in period 2, 
the rate of intervention outside priority sentences is halved in the FFS system, while it becomes 
five times lower in CAP and P4P. FFS is, in any case, always associated with the highest degree of 
focus. When access to information is free, P4P and CAP are not significantly different from one 
another (Table 6 and Figure 3). Thus, we can conclude that physicians really used information to 
focus their interventions on the priority sentences. 
																																								 																				
7… while it could be costly for the society, depending on the payment scheme.	
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This stronger impact on focus in FFS can be quantified by the 'INFO * FFS' interaction 
variable, which is significant, and adds an additional negative effect equal to -0.136 (Table 6, 
column 3). Despite their financial incentives, when physicians had access to personalized 
medicine information, they reduced their interventions outside priority sentences even though 
their income was increasing in the number of interventions. In the context of FFS, this result 
clearly reveals that our physicians had a more complex objective than mere profit maximization: 
they were behaving altruistically.8  
3.2.1.2 Free access to information and physicians’ well-treated texts 
The number and rate of well-treated texts are other quality indicators that we use to 
describe physicians’ performance. The first variable simply captures whether the physician’s 
actions generated €5 for subject 1, while the second describes the ratio of well-treated to treated 
texts. The first variable provides insights into how personalized medicine and physicians’ 
payment affect the number of patients effectively treated. The second is a more refined indicator 
that controls for the number of patients encountered (the denominator), which could differ 
across payment schemes and/or periods. We summarize our results in Table 7 and Figure 4. 
Table 7 only presents estimation results for the ratio of well-treated to treated texts. Econometric 
results on the well-treated texts are very similar.  
																																								 																				
8	 This finding on altruism is not new. Many previous works have established that physicians can demonstrate 
altruistic behaviors (most recently, Godager and Weisen, 2013; Green, 2014, among others).	
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Figure 4: Free information and physicians’ number and rate of well-treated texts 
 
As expected, the FFS system shows poor results when this second quality indicator is 
considered. More surprisingly, CAP and P4P still generate similar incentives, although ‘in theory’ 
P4P should be associated with a stronger incentive for quality interventions. The intermediary 
position of CAP may illustrate the fact that, without stressing the purely quantitative criterion of 
number of interventions performed (like the FFS), a remuneration scheme rewarding the number 
of patients treated incites toward a neutral quality/quantity trade-off, and therefore a middling 
level of quality. However, when we correct for total number of treated texts (as a denominator), 
CAP actually appears to lead to a lower rate of well-treated texts than P4P. In other words, we 
easily come back to the expected -and intuitive- result of better quality under P4P, after 
correcting for the quantitative effect of payment schemes (CAP incites physicians to treat more 
patients). 
Last, as Table 7 shows, we do not find any significant effect of (free) information on quality. 


































Table 7: Impact of free information and payment mechanisms on number of well-treated 
texts  
     Dependent variable: rate of well-treated texts 




FFS (Ref: P4P) -0.297*** (0.048) -0.263*** (0.062) 
CAP (Ref: P4P) -0.083 (0.047) -0.073 (0.048) 
INFO (Ref: No info) 0.03 (0.027) 0.003 (0.027) 
Controls included? No Yes 
Constant 0.536*** (0.031) 0.130 (0.383) 
Observations 190 190 
R2 0.174 0.187 
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.156 
F Statistic 13.018*** (df = 3; 186) 5.992*** (df = 7; 182) 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.0 
Interaction between information and payment system is not included because not significant. 
 
3.2.2 Paid access to information and physicians’ qualitative outcomes 
Access to information on priority sentences was available but had to be paid for in period 3. 
Due to the impact on benefits that we introduced, many factors could have played a role in 
physicians’ decisions: expectations of "returns on investment", altruism, perceived writing skills, 
intrinsic “appetite” for information, and the payment scheme. All these factors are potential 
sources of endogeneity. We modeled the physician’s decision by the binary variable 
“BUYINFO”. Our estimation strategy therefore has to consider the endogenous nature of 
BUYINFO and propose a consistent method to examine its impact on physicians’ behaviors. 
Having estimated a Probit model for the decision to buy information, we use estimation results in 
this subsection.  
To compare the behaviors of information buyers and non-buyers, we provide estimates of a 
2-stage Instrumental Variable Probit model. The Probit model estimated in the “first step” to 
predict the probability of investing in priority sentences under different payment schemes and 
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with the set of available individual characteristics is used here (TECHNO is our “instrument”). In 
this “second step” estimation, we use a two-stage panel least-square estimator, where the 
predicted value of the first-step model is included as an extra exogenous variable for our 
regressions. All the results presented in tables below are second-step regression results and 
corrected for the endogeneity of the decision to buy information on priority sentences.9  
Formally, we estimate the following set of equations: 𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" = 𝑐 + 𝜇!𝑃𝑎𝑦!" + η! 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂! + 𝜌!𝑋! + 𝑣!" (2) 𝑦!,! = 𝑐 +  𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑦!,! + 𝛾!𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" + 𝜃!𝑃𝑎𝑦!" ∗ 𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" + Θ!𝑋! + 𝜖!,! . (3) 
Equation (2) was previously estimated and results provided in Table 4. In equation (3):  
- 𝑦 is the outcome of individual 𝑖, (𝑖 ∈ 1− 95 ) in period 3, for treatment T. We use the 
same dependent variables as in the free information case.   
- 𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" is the predicted value of the first-step regression (buyers/non buyers). 𝛾 is a 
vector that captures the pure effect of information on the outcome.  
- 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂! captures the physician’s appetite for new technologies. This is our IV-variable.  
- All other variables are defined as previously. 
As usual, to avoid the endogeneity problem, the second-step regression (3) does not include 
the raw variable BUYINFO, the “choice” made in period 3 per se, but rather 𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂!" , the 
predicted probability. The TECHNO variable provides a strong instrument for modeling the 
decision to buy priority sentences, as TECHNO appears independent of all our dependent 
variables and correlated to the decision to buy personalized medicine. Three independent 
indicators are used to confirm that the instrument predicts the decision to invest in priority 
sentences. First, we verify that there is not independence between appetite for innovative 
technologies and decision to invest in personalized medicine (Fisher test on the contingency table 
describing the two variables < 10%). Second, comparing our regressions with and without the 
correction for endogeneity, we reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak (p-value 
<0.05). Third, in the regression analysis that models the decision to purchase personalized 
medicine, we observe that the appetite for innovative technologies is correlated with the 
likelihood of buying personalized medicine (See Table 5).   
																																								 																				
9	 For the 95 subjects, we have a total of 190 decisions observed. Using a panel technology in the second-step 




3.2.2.1 Paid access to information and physicians’ degree of focus 
We summarize our results on focus in Figure 5 and Table 8.  
Figure 5: Degree of focus (paid information) 
 












Dependent variable: focus (rate of interventions outside priority 
sentences) 
IV-Probit panel model 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
FFS (Ref: P4P) 0.338*** (0.068) 0.292*** (0.077) 0.653*** (0.123) 
CAP (Ref: P4P) -0.038 (0.057) -0.078 (0.069) 0.130 (0.144) 
BUYINFO (Ref: Non-buyers) -0.280* (0.143) -0.403** (0.179) -0.146 (0.194) 
Controls included? No Yes Yes 
BUYINFO in the FFS payment system 
  
-1.414** (0.386) 
BUYINFO in the CAP payment system 
  
-0.477 (0.376) 
Constant 0.269*** (0.086) 0.152 (0.242) -0.100 (0.245) 
Observations 190 190 190 
R2 0.468 0.487 0.523 
Adjusted R2 0.460 0.467 0.500 
Residual Std. Error 0.208 (df = 186) 0.207 (df = 182) 0.200 (df = 180) 
F Statistic 
54.637*** (df = 
3; 186) 
24.686*** (df = 7; 
182) 
21.970*** (df = 9; 
180) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
This table shows the second-step regression. See the first step in Result 1 (Table 5).  
 
When considering the effect of information, the focus (intervention rate outside priority 
sentences) is much higher in the non-buyers group than in the buyers group. Even though the 
rate of intervention outside priority sentences is still higher under FFS, Table 8 reveals that the 
net effect of the information (purged of selection bias) is stronger in FFS than in the other two 
payment schemes. This result can be interpreted as a commitment device effect that appears to operate 
on physicians deciding to buy personalized medicine information despite being paid by a non-
incentivizing scheme like FFS.10 A commitment device effect is consistent with the fact that the 
rate of intervention outside priority sentences decreased by 0.14% when access to personalized 
																																								 																				
10	This behavioral effect should be observed in CAP but is less visible in our data. In table 8, the coefficient is not 
significant. We think that our indicator of quality (“degree of focus = rate of interventions outside priority 
sentences”) is not able to detect this subtle change in behavior for buyers (in CAP, 50% of texts bore only one 
correction, which could have been made randomly both in and outside priority sentences).	
24	
	
medicine was free (column 3 of Table 6), whereas under paid access to information, we observe a 
decrease of 1.4%. It would appear that our physicians tended to make better use of information 
when they had to pay for it. 
3.2.2.2 Paid access to information and physicians’ treatment of texts 
Results on the two other indicators of quality are summarized in Figure 6 and Table 9. 












































Table 9: Impact of buying information and payment mechanisms on ratio of well-treated 
to treated texts 
 
 
Dependent variable: Ratio of well-treated to treated texts 
Model: IV-Probit panel model 
FFS (Ref: P4P) 0.001 (0.089) 
CAP (Ref: P4P) 0.121 (0.079) 
BUYINFO (Ref: Non-buyers) 0.391* (0.206) 
Controls included? Yes 
Constant -0.187 (0.278) 
Observations 190 
R2 0.147 
Adjusted R2 0.114 
Residual Std. Error (df = 182) 0.237 
F Statistic (df = 7; 182) 4.482*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
This table is the second-step regression. See the first step in Result 1. Interactions are not shown because not 
significant. 
 In Table 9, an interesting difference appears for the percentage of well-treated dictations: 
acquiring information is not only associated with a decrease in the degree of focus, but this time 
the focus is "effective". It results in a significant effect on the quality criteria (slope equal to 
+0.395, Table 9). This is probably due to the commitment device already mentioned. When 
physicians decided to invest in acquiring information, they actually used it, improving their 
percentage of appropriately corrected texts.  




Table 10: payment scheme ranking according to information structure 












CAP > P4P >FFS P4P=CAP > FFS P4P > CAP > FFS P4P > CAP > FFS 
% of well-
treated texts 
-- P4P = CAP > FFS CAP = P4P > FFS P4P = CAP> FFS 
 
This last table compares the three payment schemes in terms of our two quality outcome 
variables. We use t-tests to compare the different means across payment methods. We consider 
whether personalized medicine information was accessible, and whether this access was free or 
had to be bought. This table shows that P4P and CAP generated very similar incentives, except 
for the focus variable, where P4P did better than CAP for both buyers and non-buyers. In the 
next section, we provide a quantification framework that enables us to address a potential policy 
issue: how should access to personalized medicine provided, free of charge or paid for? 
  
4. Policy recommendation: should access to personalized medicine information be 
free or paid for? 
One of our main results is that pricing the information conveyed by personalized medicine 
could yield a social benefit: physicians better exploit information they had to pay for.11 However, 
a thorough policy recommendation should consider both the advantages and the disadvantages 
of any policy option. Here, charging for access to personalized medicine has the advantage of 
improving the effectiveness of information (because of the commitment-device effect described 
earlier), but the drawback of limiting access to information to those physicians not willing to pay 
for it. We provide a simple framework that highlights this trade-off for the policy-maker. Our key 
variable will be degree of focus, as it is the only variable for which interactions with payment 
schemes often appeared significant. We will also limit our reflection to P4P and FFS. Capitation 
																																								 																				




does not allow for comparisons, because there is not enough variation between free and paid 
access to information.  
Let us suppose that we have a community composed of N physicians (N = 95 in our case). 
Depending on the payment scheme (FFS or P4P), physicians jointly produce an outcome 𝐻! (P 
stands for the payment scheme). Aggregate outcome for each payment option is the weighted 
sum of individuals’ performances ℎ!, realized by 𝐵! buyers and (𝑁 − 𝐵!) non-buyers: 
 𝐻! = 𝐵! . ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 + 𝑁 − 𝐵! . ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 .  (1) 
We are interested in variations of 𝐻 depending on whether or not there is a price for 
information. Decomposition of equation 1 and simple differentiation12 give: 
  ∆𝐻! = 𝐵! .∆ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 + ∆𝐵! . [ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 − ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 ].   (2) 
The complete effect of charging for information is given by equation (2). The quantity ∆ℎ! is the 
positive effect of the commitment-device (from free to paid info), as measured by the 
econometric estimation for “focus” as a dependent variable. The quantity ∆𝐵! is the variation in 
the number of buyers between period 2 and period 3, for payment scheme 𝑃; this number is 
always negative. In the FFS system, our experiment showed a decrease from 49 (100% of 
beneficiaries in period 2) to 9,  ∆𝐵!!" = −40. In the P4P system, the decrease was from 95 
(100% of beneficiaries in period 2) to 55 in period 3, ∆𝐵!!! = −40. 
Using the simple calculation framework provided above, we can derive the full impact of 
charging for access to personalized medicine on the degree of focus of physicians’ interventions. 
The aggregate variation of 𝐻 in FFS would be given by: 
 == 𝐵!!" x (slopes in Table 8) + ∆𝐵!!" (slope in Table 6 for the var. Info) 
== 9 x (-1.414) – 40 (-0.227 + -0.136)  
= +1.794.  
In the same way, the aggregate variation of H in P4P would be given by: 
																																								 																				
12	∆𝐻! = 𝐵! .∆h! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 + ∆𝐵! . ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 + N − 𝐵! .∆ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 − ∆𝐵! . ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 , or: ∆𝐻! = 𝐵! .∆ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 + 𝑁 − 𝐵! .∆ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 + ∆𝐵! . [ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 − ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 ] 
We assume that ∆ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 = 0  -charging for the info has no impact on those who do not have access. Then, 
we obtain: ∆𝐻! = B!.∆ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 + ∆𝐵! . [ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 1 − ℎ! 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 0 ].	
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 == 𝐵!!! x (slopes in Table 8) + ∆𝐵!!! (slope in Table 6 for the var. Info) 
== 55 x (0) – 40 (-0.227)   
= +9,08. 
A positive value implies that the quantity of useless interventions increases when 
physicians have access to information. In FFS, the full effect of charging for info is +1.794 more 
useless interventions. In the experiment, 9 physicians did better (-1.414 useless interventions per 
physician buying info). But charging a price increased the number of physicians without info to 
40, leading to +0.363 (0.227+0.136) useless interventions per physician. In the same way, in P4P, 
the full effect of charging a price for info is +9.08 more interventions outside priority sentences.  
 Overall, our results show that, despite the existence of a commitment-device effect on the 
subset of buyers, it is still undesirable to organize paid access to personalized medicine for all 
physicians. This finding relies on the focus criterion and the set of incentives proposed in this 
experiment. It would have been interesting to perform the same analysis with other indicators. 
However, we did not find significant effects for the interaction between access to personalized 
medicine and the payment mechanism.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This article reported results from an experiment on physicians’ incentives to use 
personalized medicine techniques. Our experimental design used the same task as Green (2014), 
where proofreading stood for medical services. Green (2014) and Lagarde and Blaauw (2017) 
demonstrated the feasibility of mimicking the physician-patient relationship using a real-effort 
task. We modified Green’s experiment to consider the new context of personalized medicine, 
enriching the assessment of physicians’ payment schemes to include physicians’ choices on the 
use of personalized medicine tools, both free and paid for. We thus recreated the fundamental 
trade-offs of an agent (the physician) deciding on access to an informational technology like 
personalized medicine. This framework not only allowed us to complement the abundant 
literature on the incentive properties of physicians’ payment schemes, but also to contribute to 
the economic analysis of a newly-relevant behavior:  buying information (/technology) that can 
enhance the expert’s service provision. There may even be room for generalization to other 
contexts (other types of expertise, like law or education) where the provider has to make an 
(unobserved) informational procurement effort, enhancing the quality of services. 
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Two questions have been answered in this article.  
What determines the decision to adopt personalized medicine? We found that, 
compared to capitation and fee-for-service, pay-for-performance is associated with a higher 
probability of deciding to have access to information on priority sentences. Pay-for-performance 
was designed to reward the physician based on the number of well-treated patients. Investing in 
personalized medicine under a P4P scheme can stem both from altruism toward the patient and 
from expectation of higher financial returns. In CAP and FFS, only the altruistic motive plays a 
role in the decision, which is probably why these two payments schemes are less likely to incite 
physicians to pay to adopt personalized medicine.  
What is the impact of personalized medicine on the quality of services? We found that 
information allows physicians to better focus their interventions, regardless of the payment 
mechanism. This focus effect is greater in FFS (probably because physicians were performing too 
many interventions in the no-information regime, which left more room for improvement). This 
result suggests the need to address the use of personalized medicine as related to the current 
payment mechanisms governing physician activities.  
Last, information for personalized medicine, when it is accessible at a cost, is positively 
associated with the ratio of well-treated patients. Physicians tend to better use the information 
when they have to pay for it (all things being equal, including the selection bias). We concluded 
that this was consistent with a “commitment device”. Using a simple framework to assess the 
consequences of paid access to personalized medicine, we found that charging for information is 
not desirable in P4P and FFS. While the experiment provided evidence that physicians better 
employ information they have paid for, charging for access will necessarily reduce the adoption 
of personalized medicine, which could be detrimental for patients. This trade-off must be taken 
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  Appendix 1: summary of results on quantitative criteria 
Figure 1: Free access to information and physicians’ number of texts treated 
 
Figure 3: Free access to information and number of services 
   
We summarize all our results dealing with these two quantitative variables in the following 
table.13  
 No information With free information With paid information 
(where bought) 
# of patients  CAP>FFS=P4P FFS>CAP>P4P CAP>FFS>P4P 
# of services FFS>CAP=P4P FFS>CAP=P4P FFS>CAP>P4P 
Table 1: Payment scheme ranking according to information structure 
Appendix 2: Experimental protocol (free translation).  
																																								 																				

































Note: These instructions were the same across sessions, only differing according to the payment mechanism studied. 
In the following, we give full instructions with P4P as the remuneration scheme and we provide the specific payment 
explanation that was used for capitation and fee-for-service.  
You are participating in an experiment in economics. During this experiment, you will be 
paid based on your actions and decisions. Your actions are completely anonymous, and the data 
generated will be used by researchers. You received an ID when you arrived, and we will soon 
use it to establish your payment at the end of the experiment (2 – 3 weeks after this session). You 
will be paid with a voucher worth the amount you earned during this experiment. 
You must carry out your actions individually. In other words, you are not allowed to 
communicate with other participants. Please also put your phone in silent mode and do not use it 
during the experiment.   
This experiment is scheduled to last about 60 minutes and has two parts. You will receive 
detailed instructions before the start of each part. At the end of the second part, we will ask you 
to answer a short questionnaire. 
If you have any question at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand. This 
first part is composed of 3 periods. 
Preamble 
We will ask you to work as an expert on the 24 texts that will be given to you, to correct 
the mistakes. You will choose the number of texts to correct, as well as the number and nature of 
the corrections. In the third period, you will be asked to decide whether to invest (via deductions 
from your earnings) on information that can help you in your task. Your final earnings will result 
from these choices. 
In an experiment prior to this, we asked other subjects to work on the 24 texts that we 
are going to give you. For each text, they were instructed to highlight (with a yellow highlighter) 
the words they thought were incorrect. We have reproduced this highlighting in yellow on the 
computer. 
Your role as an expert is to correct mistakes on the words that these subjects-1 rightly or 
wrongly highlighted. By mistakes we mean lexical mistakes, grammatical errors, 
misunderstandings and mistakes in conjugation. Your actions will determine your earnings as well 
as part of the earnings of the first participants (subject-1). A crucial point, which must be borne 
in mind, is that, for each text, only the corrected errors in certain sentences, which we will now 
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call “priority sentences”, will generate earnings for the subject-1. In certain periods of the game, 
we will tell you which are the priority sentences, while in other cases you may be asked to decide 
to have this information (in exchange for a sum of money deducted from your earnings. We will 
return to this later). 
Because of your correction work, the subject-1 will earn €5 for the text if, in the priority 
sentences (regardless of the total number of errors in the texts), you correct all the incorrect 
words, with one error allowed each time. Thus, if a text contains, for example, a total of 3 
incorrect words in all its priority sentences, you will need to correct 2 out of the 3 to save €5 for 
the subject-1. The number and location of priority sentences vary from one text to another. 
The game is calibrated so that the subject-1 earns between €5 and €30 according to the 
actions you have performed in this room (this remuneration is added to a small remuneration 
already granted to the subject-1 for the highlighting). 
The 3 periods of the game.  
3 game periods will follow. You can work on up to 8 texts for each of the 3 periods, that 
is 24 in total for this part. The 3 periods are as follows: 
(i) During period 1, you will work on 8 texts maximum without any information 
about the priority sentences. In other words, your texts will only contain the 
yellow highlights suggested by the subject-1 but you will not know which sentence 
corrections would ensure him the highest earnings. 
(ii) During period 2, we will indicate the priority sentences for the subject-1 by 
highlighting them. Thus, in period 2, you will know which sentences will 
potentially be of benefit to the subject-1. 
(iii) During period 3, we will let you choose between two possible sets of texts: A and 
B. Your choice of a given set will be irreversible during this period. In set A, the 8 
texts will be presented as in period 2 – with the underlined priority sentences – 
while in set B, the 8 texts will be presented as in period 1 – without any 
identification of the priority sentences–. If you opt for set A, you will bear a cost 
of €0.50 per text processed, pre-deducted from your earnings as the price for 
access to information. If you choose set B, you will not incur any costs and your 
texts will be presented as in period 1.  
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Your earnings (P4P) 
For this part, we will remunerate the quality of your intervention on the texts. We have a 
"quality criterion" which we specify below. For each period, your earnings will be calculated as 
follows: 
• Earnings in period 1 = €2.50* Number of texts for which the quality criterion is satisfied. 
• Earnings in period 2 = €2.50* Number of texts for which the quality criterion is satisfied.  
• Earnings in period 3 = €2.50* Number of texts for which the quality criterion is satisfied. 
From this sum we will deduct some expenditures for the period. 
o If you choose set A, the expenditure will be €0.50 * number of texts on which 
you have worked. 
o If you choose set B, you will have no expenditure. 
Quality criterion: Each text has a minimum of 6 words and a maximum of 12 words 
highlighted in all sentences (priority or not). The quality criterion is exclusively based on the 
correctness of the priority sentences. The number of words that must be correctly written at the 
end of your intervention is presented as follows: 
Number of words requiring intervention in priority 
sentences 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Quality criterion: minimum number of words to be written 
correctly to earn €2.5 per text 
2 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 
 
 
The information in this table is to be read as follows (column in bold): If a text contains 4 
words highlighted in the priority sentences (regardless of the number of words outside the 
priority sentences), at the end of your intervention 3 out of the 4 words must be written correctly 
in order for you to earn €2.50 for this text. 
Note: At the end of the experiment, one of the above three periods will be drawn at 
random. Your earnings during the period will constitute your payment for that part. 
Time allocation 
Each period will last 5 minutes, and you are free to allocate your time between the texts as 
you wish. You can choose not to correct texts (no handwritten intervention on the text), 
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especially if you want to spend more time on other texts. At the end of each of the 3 periods, the 
experimenters will retrieve your 8 texts and start the following period with 8 new texts, signaling 
the kick-off for 5 new minutes. Between periods 2 and 3, you will have a moment dedicated to 
formulating your choice of one of the two sets of texts (A – priority sentences underlined – or B 
– priority sentences not underlined –). 
End of the general instructions. 
The following two paragraphs concern changes to the payment in each period.  
Your earnings (FFS) 
You receive in this part a "payment for intervention". The "Intervention payment" 
establishes a payment proportional to the number of corrections made (whether they are 
appropriate or not).  
• Earnings in period 1 = €0.30 * Total number of words you have tried to correct among 
the words already highlighted. 
• Earnings in period 2 = €0.30 * Total number of words you have tried to correct among 
the words already highlighted. 
• Earnings in period 3 = €0.30 * Total number of words you have tried to correct among 
the words already highlighted. From this sum we will be deduct some expenditures for 
the period. 
o If you choose text set A, the expenditure will be €0.50 * number of texts on 
which you have worked. 
o If you choose text set B, you will have no expenditure. 
Note: At the end of the experiment, one of the above three periods will be drawn at random. 
Your earnings during the period will constitute your payment for that part. 
Your earnings (Payment per text) – CAPITATION –  
You will receive in this part a "text payment". This "Text Payment" is a fixed 
remuneration per text on which you have made one or more corrections, whether these 
corrections are appropriate or not. 
Earnings in period 1 = €1.75 * Total number of texts on which you have worked. 
• Earnings in period 2 = €1.75 * Total number of texts on which you have worked. 
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• Earnings in period 3 = €1.75 * Total number of texts on which you have worked. From 
this sum we will be deduct some expenditures for the period. 
o If you choose text set A, the expenditure will be €0.50 * number of dictations on 
which you have worked. 
o If you choose text set B, you will have no expenditure. 
Note: At the end of the experiment, one of the above three periods will be drawn at random. 
Your earnings during the period will constitute your payment for that part. 
 
